精英俘获、任人唯贤与社会稳定：来自中国科举制度的证据
Elite Capture, Meritocracy and Social Stability: Evidence from the Chinese Imperial Examinations
NBER Working Papers · 2026 · [{"name": "Jingjing Chen", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Jianlei Han", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Shing-Yi Wang", "affiliation": []}, {"name": "Yongxiang Wang", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
本文考察了北宋时期中国科举制度的改革，这些改革对考试答卷实行匿名处理，并取消了地方官员推荐考生的自由裁量权。我们使用960—1127年的府级数据和双重差分设计，比较存在与不存在显赫精英家族的地区，因为在后一类地区腐败和精英俘获更可能发生。改革提高了平民出身者在录取者中的占比，并缩小了他们与精英出身者在学识和政治成就方面的表现差距，表明对平民人才的选拔有所改善。处理组各府的社会动荡也有所减少。总体而言，这些改革强化了任人唯贤，拓宽了政治参与渠道，并促进了社会稳定。
Abstract
This paper examines reforms in China’s imperial examination system during the Northern Song dynasty that anonymized exam submissions and ended local officials’ discretion to recommend candidates. Using prefecture-level data from 960–1127 and a difference-in-differences design, we compare areas with and without prominent elite families, where corruption and elite capture were more likely. The reforms increased the share of successful candidates from commoner backgrounds and narrowed their performance gaps with elites in scholarship and political achievement, indicating better selection of commoner talent. Treated prefectures also saw less social unrest. Overall, the reforms strengthened meritocracy, broadened political access, and promoted stability.