中文摘要
央行官员认为, 可编程数字货币可能损害货币的统一性或单一性。我们在一个程式化模型中考察这一观点: 在该模型中, 可编程货币内生地产生, 且以不同方式编程的货币具有不同的流动性。可编程性通过缓解承诺摩擦提供私人价值, 但在信息摩擦下会带来社会成本。保持统一性未必对社会有益。当信息摩擦轻微时, 禁止可编程货币会降低福利; 但当承诺摩擦较低时, 禁止可编程货币反而会提高福利。这些洞见表明, 可编程货币在无许可区块链上可能更具益处, 因为在此类区块链上难以作出承诺, 但交易可被公开观察。(JEL D83, E42, E52, E58)
Abstract
Central bankers argue that programmable digital currencies may compromise the uniformity or singleness of money. We explore this view in a stylized model where programmable money arises endogenously, and differently programmed monies have varying liquidity. Programmability provides private value by easing commitment frictions but imposes social costs under informational frictions. Preserving uniformity is not necessarily socially beneficial. Banning programmable money lowers welfare when informational frictions are mild but improves it when commitment frictions are low. These insights suggest that programmable money could be more beneficial on permissionless blockchains, where it is difficult to commit but trades are publicly observable. (JEL D83, E42, E52, E58)