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助推何时能提升福利?

When Do Nudges Increase Welfare?
American Economic Review · 2025 · Hunt Allcott、Daniel Cohen、William H. Morrison、Dmitry Taubinsky

中文摘要

我们采用公共财政中的充分统计量方法,刻画在存在税收和内生价格的市场中,“助推”(如简化信息和警示标签)的福利效应。许多研究关注平均效应,而我们表明,福利还取决于助推如何影响选择扭曲的方差;当税收转嫁率为零或税收处于最优水平时,平均效应将不再相关。我们利用评估汽车燃油经济性标签和含糖饮料健康标签的实验来实施这一框架。标签减少了低燃油经济性汽车和含糖饮料的购买,但可能因增大选择扭曲的方差而降低福利。(JEL D18、D62、D83、D91、H21、L62、L66)

Abstract

We use public finance sufficient statistic approaches to characterize the welfare effects of “nudges,” such as simplified information and warning labels, in markets with taxes and endogenous prices. While many studies focus on average effects, we show that welfare also depends on how the nudge affects the variance of choice distortions, and average effects become irrelevant with zero pass-through or optimal taxes. We implement the framework with experiments evaluating automotive fuel economy labels and sugary drink health labels. Labels decrease purchases of low-fuel economy cars and sugary drinks but may decrease welfare because they increase the variance of choice distortions. (JEL D18, D62, D83, D91, H21, L62, L66)
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