Efficiency in Household Decision-Making: Evidence from the Retirement Savings of US Couples
中文摘要
本文研究夫妇如何在双方各自的账户之间分配退休储蓄缴款。利用一个涵盖逾百万美国个人的新数据集，我们发现，退休储蓄缴款并未分配至雇主匹配缴款比例最高的账户。这种与大多数家庭决策模型的假设相悖的缺乏协调现象十分普遍、成本高昂、随时间持续存在，并且无法用惯性、自动加入机制或简单启发式规则来解释。作为对行政记录证据的补充，我们结合一项在线调查发现，低效率的分配既反映了财务决策失误，也反映了有意为之的选择，尤其是在家庭内部信任和承诺较弱的情况下。(JEL D13, G51, J26, J32)
Abstract
We study how couples allocate retirement-saving contributions across each spouse’s account. In a new dataset covering over a million US individuals, we find retirement contributions are not allocated to the account with the highest employer match rate. This lack of coordination—which goes against the assumptions of most models of household decision-making—is common, costly, persistent over time, and cannot be explained by inertia, auto-enrollment, or simple heuristics. Complementing the administrative evidence with an online survey, we find that inefficient allocations reflect both financial mistakes as well as deliberate choices, especially when trust and commitment inside the households are weak. (JEL D13, G51, J26, J32)