Efficiency in Household Decision-Making: Evidence from the Retirement Savings of US Couples
中文摘要
我们研究夫妇如何在双方各自的账户之间分配退休储蓄缴款。利用一项涵盖逾百万美国个人的新数据集，我们发现退休储蓄缴款并未被分配至雇主匹配比例最高的账户。这种缺乏协调的现象——与大多数家庭决策模型的假设相悖——十分普遍、代价高昂、长期持续，且无法由惯性、自动加入机制或简单启发式规则来解释。在行政数据证据之外，我们还结合了一项在线调查，发现低效率的分配既反映了财务决策失误，也反映了有意为之的选择，尤其是在家庭内部信任与承诺较弱时。(JEL D13, G51, J26, J32)
Abstract
We study how couples allocate retirement-saving contributions across each spouse’s account. In a new dataset covering over a million US individuals, we find retirement contributions are not allocated to the account with the highest employer match rate. This lack of coordination—which goes against the assumptions of most models of household decision-making—is common, costly, persistent over time, and cannot be explained by inertia, auto-enrollment, or simple heuristics. Complementing the administrative evidence with an online survey, we find that inefficient allocations reflect both financial mistakes as well as deliberate choices, especially when trust and commitment inside the households are weak. (JEL D13, G51, J26, J32)