中文摘要
中央银行希望避免自我实现的波动。对实际利率作单位反应的利率规则，能够在关于家庭和企业行为最弱的可能假设下实现这一目标。此类规则对家庭异质性、手到口（hand-to-mouth）消费者、家庭或企业的非理性预期、积极的财政政策，以及任何形式的跨期或名义—实际联系均具有稳健性。此类规则在实践中易于运用，可利用通胀保值债券推断实际利率。在短期通胀目标随时间变化的情况下，它们能够实施任意的通胀路径，包括最优政策。这提供了一种将政策制定者期望的通胀路径转化为名义利率路径的方法。鉴于美国货币政策制定者所期望的通胀路径，美联储的行为与实际利率规则所预测的结果惊人地接近。实际利率规则之所以有效，是因为费雪方程在货币传导中发挥着关键作用。
Abstract
Central banks wish to avoid self‐fulfilling fluctuations. Interest rate rules with a unit response to real rates achieve this under the weakest possible assumptions about the behavior of households and firms. They are robust to household heterogeneity, hand‐to‐mouth consumers, non‐rational household or firm expectations, active fiscal policy, and to any form of intertemporal or nominal‐real links. They are easy to employ in practice, using inflation‐protected bonds to infer real rates. With a time‐varying short‐term inflation target, they can implement an arbitrary inflation path, including optimal policy. This provides a way to translate policy makers' desired path for inflation into one for nominal rates. U.S. Federal Reserve behavior is remarkably close to that predicted by a real rate rule, given the desired inflation path of U.S. monetary policy makers. Real rate rules work thanks to the key role played by the Fisher equation in monetary transmission.