中文摘要
短期远程工作的在线劳务平台上，求职者数量远多于可提供的工作岗位。尽管劳动者相对充裕，他们仍能获得交易剩余的很大一部分。我们根据需求估计得出这一结论：该估计表明，劳动者工资中包含相对于成本的显著加成，一项调查也验证了我们对剩余的估计。劳动者之所以能保留剩余中的显著份额，是因为需求方的搜寻摩擦与劳动者差异化降低了直接竞争。最后，我们表明，将传统就业法规适用于在线零工经济平台会降低职位发布率和雇用率，从而减少包括劳动者在内所有市场参与者的总剩余。（JEL C83, F31, J22, J23, J31, J64, M51）
Abstract
Online labor platforms for short-term remote work have many more job seekers than available jobs. Despite their relative abundance, workers capture a substantial share of the surplus from transactions. We draw this conclusion from demand estimates that imply workers’ wages include significant markups over costs and a survey that validates our surplus estimates. Workers retain a significant share of the surplus because demand-side search frictions and worker differentiation reduce direct competition. Finally, we show that applying traditional employment regulations to online gig economy platforms would lower job posting and hiring rates, reducing aggregate surplus for all market participants, including workers. (JEL C83, F31, J22, J23, J31, J64, M51)