Additionality and Asymmetric Information in Environmental Markets: Evidence from Conservation Auctions
American Economic Review · 2026 · Karl M. Aspelund、Anna Russo
中文摘要
旨在以低成本减少环境退化的机制，可能因参与者的保护行动并非由激励所引致的边际行动——即不具备“额外性”——而受到削弱，因为成本最低的参与者未必是社会价值最高的参与者。我们以“保护储备计划”生态系统服务拍卖机制为对象研究这一问题，将投标数据与卫星衍生的土地利用数据相关联。四分之三的边际拍卖中标者不具备额外性。反事实土地利用的异质性引入了逆向选择。我们构建了一个投标与额外性模型，以量化其福利含义。替代性拍卖设计通过采用纳入预期土地利用影响的评分规则，提高了效率。（JEL D44, D82, Q24, Q57, R14）
Abstract
Mechanisms that aim to reduce environmental degradation at low cost can be undermined when participants' conservation actions are not marginal to the incentive—or “additional”—as the lowest-cost participants may not be the highest social value. We investigate this challenge in the Conservation Reserve Program's auction mechanism for ecosystem services, linking bids to satellite-derived land use. Three-quarters of marginal auction winners are not additional. The heterogeneity in counterfactual land use introduces adverse selection. We develop a model of bidding and additionality to quantify welfare implications. Alternative auctions increase efficiency by using scoring rules that incorporate expected land use impacts. (JEL D44, D82, Q24, Q57, R14)