American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2026 · Jamein P. Cunningham、Rob Gillezeau
中文摘要
本文采用事件研究设计，考察各州对警察工会引入强制谈判要求，是否导致执法人员造成的平民死亡人数发生实质性变化。我们发现，集体谈判权的引入显著增加了警察致死的平民数量，尤其是非白人平民，而对警员安全的影响有限。我们的结果表明，1959年至1988年间，赋予执法部门谈判权可以解释所有因合法干预致死的非白人平民人数中的14%。鉴于我们的发现，警察工会加剧暴力这一观点具有实证依据。(JEL J15, J51, J52, K42)
Abstract
Using an event-study design, we examine whether states' introduction of duty-to-bargain requirements for police unions led to meaningful changes in civilians killed by law enforcement. We find that the introduction of collective bargaining rights significantly increases the number of civilians killed by police, particularly among non-White civilians, while having limited effects on officer safety. Our results indicate that the adoption of bargaining rights for law enforcement can explain 14 percent of all non-White civilian deaths by legal intervention between 1959 and 1988. Given our findings, the idea that police unions exacerbate violence is empirically grounded. (JEL J15, J51, J52, K42)