American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2023 · Sebastian Axbard、Zichen Deng
中文摘要
政府规制往往未能被公职人员完全执行。本文利用中国引入空气污染监测站这一事件，考察对政策结果的实时监测是否会影响现有规制的执行。利用中央政府制定的监测站设置标准，以及地方执法活动的新型地理编码数据，我们发现监测会：（i）加强对本地企业的执法；（ii）提高执法目标选择的精准度；（iii）降低总体污染水平。这些效应主要由面临绩效激励的官员所驱动，且在数据操纵空间有限时更强，表明实时监测改善了自上而下的问责机制。（JEL K32, L51, O13, P25, P28, Q52, Q53）
Abstract
Government regulations are often imperfectly enforced by public officials. In this study, we exploit the introduction of air pollution monitors in China to investigate whether real-time monitoring of policy outcomes affects the enforcement of existing regulations. Using assignment criteria established by the central government and new georeferenced data on local enforcement activities, we show that monitoring (i) increases enforcement against local firms, (ii) improves the targeting of enforcement, and (iii) reduces aggregate pollution. These effects are driven by officials facing performance incentives and are stronger when there is limited scope for data manipulation, suggesting that real-time monitoring improves top-down accountability. (JEL K32, L51, O13, P25, P28, Q52, Q53)