American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2023 · Justin Holz、Rafael Jiménez-Durán、Eduardo Laguna-Müggenburg
中文摘要
美国有34个州禁止在紧急状态期间涨价，个人会采取成本高昂的行动举报违规者。我们通过实验测量了消费者为举报提高个人防护装备价格的卖家所愿支付的金额。超过75%的受试者愿意付费举报，即使其他人愿意按这些价格购买。我们认为，举报包含了希望阻止或惩罚以不公平或非法价格进行的第三方交易的意愿这一信息。举报行为部分源于对企业利润或加价的厌恶，这意味着生产者与消费者之间的剩余分配对福利具有重要影响。（JEL C93, D22, D63, D91, H12, K22）
Abstract
Thirty-four states prohibit price increases during emergencies, and individuals take costly actions to report violators. We measure experimentally the willingness to pay to report sellers who increase prices of personal protective equipment. Over 75 percent of subjects pay to report, even if others are willing to buy at those prices. We argue that reports contain information about a desire to prevent or punish third-party transactions at unfair or illicit prices. Reports are partially driven by a distaste for firm profits or markups, implying that the distribution of surplus between producers and consumers matters for welfare. (JEL C93, D22, D63, D91, H12, K22)