Journal of Labor Economics · 2023 · Nicolás Ajzenman、Eleonora Bertoni、Gregory Elacqua、Luana Marotta、Carolina Méndez Vargas
中文摘要
高质量教师资源获取的不平等，是造成学生社会经济地位相关成绩差距的重要驱动因素。我们通过实验评估了一项新颖的全国性低成本政府项目，该项目旨在减少教师分流。具体而言，我们检验了两种旨在激励教师申请弱势学校职位空缺的行为策略。两种策略分别为“利他身份”处理组和“外在激励”处理组：前者通过提高教师利他身份的显著性来启动其利他身份，后者则简化现有政府货币激励计划的信息并提高其显著性，该计划奖励在资源匮乏机构任教的教师。我们表明，两种策略均能有效促使教师候选人申请此类职位空缺，并提高其被安排在弱势学校参加最终现场评估的可能性。对表现优异教师的影响更大，尤其是在“利他”处理组。我们的结果表明，低成本行为策略能够增加愿意在高需求地区任教的专业人员的供给，并提高其质量。
Abstract
Inequality in access to high-quality teachers is an important driver of student socioeconomic achievement gaps. We experimentally evaluate a novel nation-wide low-cost government program aimed at reducing teacher sorting. Specifically, we tested two behavioral strategies designed to motivate teachers to apply to job vacancies in disadvantaged schools. These strategies consisted of an "Altruistic Identity" treatment arm, which primed teachers' altruistic identity by making it more salient, and an "Extrinsic Incentives" arm, which simplified the information and increased the salience of an existing government monetary-incentive scheme rewarding teachers who work in underprivileged institutions. We show that both strategies are successful in triggering teacher candidates to apply to such vacancies, as well as make them more likely to be assigned to a final in-person evaluation in a disadvantaged school. The effect among high-performing teachers is larger, especially in the "Altruistic" arm. Our results imply that low-cost behavioral strategies can enhance the supply and quality of professionals willing to teach in high-need areas.