中文摘要
本文构建了一个理论框架，并提供因果证据，解释在缺乏市场机制和价格信号的电力系统中，政府在高温时期实施限电策略的合理性。通过将全面的中国企业面板数据与高分辨率气象数据相结合，我们记录了稳健证据，表明高温显著降低了企业的用电量和经营绩效。随后，我们基于以省际水电依赖度加权的降水异常构造供给冲击，以识别限电。这些分析表明，近年来中国各地企业层面的限电现象持续普遍存在。此外，我们发现，在高温引发的电力短缺期间，将电力从工业部门转向居民部门虽然会降低企业绩效，但从社会规划者的角度看，这一结果实现了福利最大化。我们的研究结果揭示了气候变化如何加剧部门间的电力竞争，市场低效在解释中国的限电模式中发挥着关键作用。
Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical framework and provides causal evidence explaining the rationality of government-imposed power rationing strategies during high-temperature periods in electricity systems lacking market mechanisms and price signals. By combining comprehensive panel data on Chinese firms with high-resolution meteorological data , we document robust evidence that high temperatures significantly reduce both electricity usage and operational performance among firms. We then construct supply shocks based on precipitation anomalies weighted by the inter-provincial hydropower dependence to identify power rationing. These analyses demonstrate the persistent prevalence of firm-level power rationing across China in recent years. Furthermore, we show that while redirecting electricity from industrial to residential sectors during heat-induced shortages reduces firm performance, this represents a welfare-maximizing outcome from a social planner's perspective. Our findings reveal how climate change intensifies inter-sectoral electricity competition, with market inefficiencies playing a critical role in explaining China's rationing patterns.