中文摘要
本文研究选民收买的后果。选民收买是指以私人利益为交换，诱使外来者通过欺诈手段将其选民登记转移至其他辖区的行为。具体而言，我考察了巴西2007年旨在遏制选民收买的选民重新登记改革的影响。利用被纳入改革的市镇在划定标准上的不连续性，我考察了对选民收买施加外生障碍后，市长选举、公共支出和社会经济结果的变化。改革提高了政治竞争程度，并改善了政治人物的选拔。受教育程度较高、资质较好且较少可能隶属于庇护主义政党的候选人，更有可能参选并赢得市长选举。这些政治变化推动医疗卫生和学校支出增加——这两类项目型公共品是贫困选民高度关注的。支出增加改善了健康结果，包括降低婴儿死亡率，也改善了学校教育投入，包括增加学校、教师和在校学生数量。对内在机制的探讨证实，政治人物选拔的改善和选民构成的变化是驱动这些结果的关键因素。我还表明，非预期的选举权剥夺和在任者声誉效应并非这些结果的驱动因素。
Abstract
I study the consequences of voter-buying, defined as the act of inducing outsiders to fraudulently transfer their voter registration across jurisdictions in exchange for private benefits. Specifically, I explore the effects of Brazil’s 2007 voter re-registration reform which was intended to curb voter-buying. Exploiting a discontinuity in the targeting of municipalities assigned to the reform, I examine the response of mayoral elections, public expenditures and socioeconomic outcomes to the imposition of exogenous barriers to voter-buying. The reform led to an increase in political competition, and positive politician selection. Educated and qualified candidates who are less likely to belong to clientelist parties are more likely to enter and win mayoral elections. These political changes induce a rise in healthcare and school expenditures — programmatic public goods salient to poor voters. These increased expenditures result in better health outcomes, including reduced infant mortality, and better schooling inputs, including more schools, teachers, and student enrollment. Exploration of underlying mechanisms confirms that positive politician selection and changes to the electorate composition are the key drivers of the results. I also show that unintended disenfranchisement and incumbent reputation effects are not driving the results.