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平台费用规制

Regulating Platform Fees
Journal of the European Economic Association · 2024 · Chengsi Wang、Julian Wright

中文摘要

我们考察帮助消费者发现供应商并与之交易的平台。这类平台已在许多经济部门占据主导地位,由此引发了对其向供应商收取高额费用的担忧,尤其是因为这些平台往往会使其聚合的供应商同质化(商品化)。我们表明,在基准情形下,有效率的平台费用由一个简单公式决定:该费用等于平台的边际成本,加上供应商在直接渠道上的加价与其在平台上的加价之差。我们进一步探讨,在更一般的情形下,这一简单公式能够在多大程度上为平台费用规制提供一个稳健的上限。

Abstract

Abstract We consider platforms that help consumers discover and transact with suppliers. Such platforms have come to dominate many sectors of the economy, raising issues about the high fees they charge suppliers, especially since they tend to commoditize the suppliers they aggregate. We show that in a baseline setting, the efficient platform fee is determined by a simple formula: it equals the platform’s marginal cost plus the difference between suppliers’ markups on the direct channel and suppliers’ markups on the platform. We explore the extent to which this simple formula provides a robust cap for regulating the platform’s fee more generally.
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