Can Financial Incentives to Firms Improve Apprenticeship Training? Experimental Evidence from Ghana
AER: Insights · 2024 · Gabriel Brown、Morgan Hardy、Isaac Mbiti、Jamie McCasland、Isabelle Salcher
中文摘要
我们利用一项田野实验，检验经济激励能否提高学徒培训质量。处理组的培训师（企业主）参加了一项锦标赛式激励方案，其报酬取决于学徒在技能测评中的排名表现；对照组的培训师则根据学徒是否参加测评获得固定报酬。处理组在测评中的表现更高。两年后，处理组学徒在一项低风险口头技能测试中的得分高出0.15个标准差，总收入高出24%，这一差异由更高的自雇利润所驱动。（JEL D22, D82, J24, J31, M53, O12）
Abstract
We use a field experiment to test whether financial incentives can improve the quality of apprenticeship training. Trainers (firm owners) in the treatment group participated in a tournament incentive scheme where they received a payment based on their apprentices’ rank-order performance on a skills assessment. Trainers in the control group received a fixed payment based on their apprentices’ participation in the assessment. Performance on the assessment was higher in the treatment group. Two years later, treated apprentices scored 0.15σ higher on a low-stakes oral skills test and earned 24 percent more in total earnings, driven by higher self-employment profits. (JEL D22, D82, J24, J31, M53, O12)