中文摘要
标榜以才取人的制度往往同时也是推动重要社会网络形成的引擎。我们以中国科举制度——历史上存续时间最长的精英选拔制度之一——为对象考察这一双重角色。我们依据清代（1644—1905年）112次全国考试中24,269名个体的考试成绩数据，追踪其中哪些人最终晋升为高级官员。优异的考试成绩提高了获得高位的可能性，但晋升还取决于个体与有权势考官的关联。由于考试成绩与有权势考官的关联之间存在强互补性，即便社会网络发挥作用，个体的成功表面上仍显得依靠才学。在1840年代的重大政治变革之后，考官关联的重要性依然延续，尽管有权势的考官本身发生了更替。这些发现有助于解释为何此类制度即使在网络作用极为重要时仍能保持其正当性。
Abstract
Institutions that claim to reward merit often also serve as engines that drive the formation of important social networks. We examine this dual role in China’s Imperial Examination, one of history’s longest-lived meritocratic systems. We draw on exam performance data for 24,269 individuals across 112 national examinations in the Qing dynasty (1644–1905) and trace who among them rose to become top officials. Strong exam performance increased the likelihood of attaining high office, but advancement also depended on individuals’ ties to powerful examiners. Because performance and ties to powerful examiners were strongly complementary, individuals’ success appeared to rest on merit even as social networks played a role. Following the major political transformations of the 1840s, the importance of examiner ties persisted, although the influential examiners themselves changed. These findings help explain why such systems retain legitimacy even when networks matter greatly.