NBER Working Papers · 2026 · Joshua S. Gans
中文摘要
自动化能否在不替代工人的情况下损害工人利益？我们研究这样一类工作：工人既看重产出有用的成果，也看重该成果有赖于自身贡献这一事实。即使企业保留工人，一个可信的机器替代方案也可能削弱这第二重意义来源。我们的模型表明，当工资充分调整时，这种损失会提高薪酬；当工资仅部分调整时，工人自身将承担部分损失。这一结果也可能使自动化更容易发生。外部开发者可以通过在授权机器使用前公开展示机器而获利，因为展示会降低人力替代方案的价值。这种“意义外部性”可能创造对机器的需求，并使有利可图的开发对社会有害。更好的技术质量与更强的公众显著性具有不同的效应：质量提升产出，而显著性本身会削弱人类工作的价值。因此，自动化可能在消除就业岗位之前就已降低工作的价值。
Abstract
Can automation harm workers without replacing them? We study jobs in which workers value both producing useful output and knowing that the output depends on their own contribution. A credible machine alternative can weaken that second source of meaning even when the firm retains the worker. Our model shows that this loss raises compensation when wages adjust fully; when they adjust only partly, workers bear some of the loss themselves. It can also make automation more likely. An external developer may profit by publicly demonstrating a machine before licensing it, because the demonstration lowers the value of the human alternative. This "meaning externality" can create demand for the machine and make profitable development socially harmful. Better technical quality and greater public salience have different effects: quality improves output, while salience alone weakens human work. Automation can, therefore, reduce the value of work before it eliminates jobs.