煤电市场中的政策不确定性：以空气有毒物质标准为例

中文摘要

政府政策不确定性会影响技术采用与退出等不可逆决策。本文量化了围绕《汞和空气有毒物质标准》（MATS）的不确定性。我们估计了一个针对燃煤发电企业的动态寡头模型，从中恢复发电企业对未来MATS执行情况的信念。我们提出了近似信念寡头均衡（approximate belief oligopoly equilibrium）概念，在该均衡中，参与者理解自身决策会影响市场总体状态。MATS的执行造成了显著的不确定性：感知到的执行概率降至43%。提前消除不确定性将使利润增加13.9亿美元，但也会使污染成本增加6.52亿至17.76亿美元。若退出可能性较低，提前消除不确定性则会减少污染。

Abstract

Government policy uncertainty affects irreversible decisions including technology adoption and exit. This paper quantifies uncertainty surrounding the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS). We estimate a dynamic oligopoly model for coal-fired electricity generators that recovers generators’ beliefs regarding future MATS enforcement. We develop the approximate belief oligopoly equilibrium concept, where players understand that their decisions impact aggregate market states. MATS enforcement created substantial uncertainty: the perceived enforcement probability dropped to 43%. Resolving uncertainty early would increase profits by $1.39 billion but also increase pollution costs by $0.652–$1.776 billion. Had exit been unlikely, resolving uncertainty early would have decreased pollution.