中文摘要
我们以警察逮捕行为为研究对象，考察公共部门劳动者如何权衡其职业动机与私人经济考量。警员在临近轮班结束时实施的逮捕通常需要加班，警员对此的反应是降低逮捕频率、提高逮捕质量。警员在结束警务轮班后还从事第二份工作的日子机会成本更高，这也减少了轮班末期的逮捕。将上述估计结果纳入一个动态模型，可识别警员对工作场所活动与加班工作的偏好。结果表明，警员实施逮捕的私人成本对执法的数量与质量具有一阶影响。(JEL K42, J33, J45)
Abstract
We study how public sector workers balance their professional motivations with private economic concerns, focusing on police arrests. Arrests made near the end of an officer's shift typically require overtime work, and officers respond by reducing arrest frequency but increasing arrest quality. Days in which an officer works a second job after their police shift have higher opportunity cost, also reducing late-shift arrests. Combining our estimates in a dynamic model identifies officer preferences over workplace activity and overtime work. Our results indicate that officers' private costs of arrests have a first-order impact on the quantity and quality of enforcement. (JEL K42, J33, J45)