Merger Effects and Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence from US Consumer Packaged Goods
American Economic Review · 2023 · Vivek Bhattacharya、Gastón Illanes、David Stillerman
中文摘要
我们考察了一整套消费包装品制造商并购对价格、数量和产品品种的影响。在各种设定下，我们发现并购的平均价格效应较小（−0.5%至−1.1%），但存在实质性异质性，标准差介于3.9至7.6个百分点之间。通过构建一个执法模型，我们发现，执法机构的行为如同其只会挑战那些预期将使价格上涨超过4.8%至6.3%的并购。提高执法严格程度将降低价格水平，并减少已完成的价格上涨型并购的普遍性，而对被阻止的价格下降型并购的影响极小，但会显著加重执法机构的负担。（JEL D43, G34, K21, L13, L41, L66）
Abstract
We document the effects of a comprehensive set of mergers of consumer packaged goods manufacturers on prices, quantities, and product assortment. Across specifications, we find a small average price effect of mergers (−0.5−1.1 percent) but substantial heterogeneity, with a standard deviation between 3.9 and 7.6 percentage points. Through a model of enforcement, we find that agencies act as if they challenge mergers they expect would increase prices more than 4.8 to 6.3 percent. Increases in stringency would reduce prices and the prevalence of completed price-increasing mergers, with minimal impacts on blocked price-decreasing mergers, at significantly greater agency burden. (JEL D43, G34, K21, L13, L41, L66)