设计动态重新分配机制：来自全科医生分配的证据

中文摘要

我们研究当主体对物品的偏好随时间变化时，如何设计动态重新分配机制这一问题。以挪威将患者（重新）分配给全科医生（GP）的制度为背景，我们提供了现行机制下存在错配的直接证据——患者彼此等待对方的全科医生，却无法进行交换——并估计了一个全科医生转换行为的结构模型，以评估替代方案。引入最高交易循环（TTC）平均而言将缩短等待时间并提高患者福利。然而，被分配到较不理想全科医生的患者将因此受损。优先照顾这些患者可以在避免此类损害的同时，保留TTC带来的大部分收益。（JEL D82、H51、I11、I13、I18）

Abstract

We study the problem of designing a dynamic reassignment mechanism when agents' preferences over objects change over time. In the context of Norway's system for (re)assigning patients to general practitioners (GPs), we provide direct evidence of misallocation under the current mechanism—patients waiting for each others' GPs, but who cannot trade—and estimate a structural model of GP-switching behavior to evaluate alternatives. Introducing top trading cycles (TTC) would, on average, reduce waiting times and increase patient welfare. However, patients endowed with less desirable GPs would be harmed. Prioritizing these patients can avoid these harms while preserving most of the gains from TTC. (JEL D82, H51, I11, I13, I18)