中文摘要
我们以公共部门为研究对象, 考察一个部门的制度性工资改革如何溢出到其他部门。我们利用日本一项仅在部分市町村削减公共部门工资的政策改革, 以及只有年轻劳动者才有资格获得公共部门工作的制度环境。我们发现, 公共部门工资削减1%会使年轻劳动者的私营部门工资降低0.3%。当公共部门工作作为劳动者的外部选择更为重要时, 这一溢出弹性更大。我们还发现证据表明, 私营部门企业的就业与利润会因公共部门减薪而扩张。
Abstract
We study how institutional wage reforms in one sector spill over to other sectors by focusing on the public sector. We leverage the Japanese policy reform that cut public-sector wages only in certain municipalities and the institutional setting in which only young workers are eligible for public-sector jobs. We find that a 1% public-sector wage cut reduces the private-sector wages of young workers by 0.3%. This spillover elasticity is greater when public-sector jobs are more important as workers’ outside options. We also find evidence that private-sector firms’ employment and profits expand in response to the public-sector wage cut.