Corruption as a Local Advantage: Evidence from the Indigenization of Nigerian Oil
中文摘要
在治理薄弱国家的采掘业部门，跨国公司面临武装团体对资源的盗窃。尽管企业愿意为保护付费，但国家腐败往往纵容此类犯罪行为。本文研究了尼日利亚石油部门的本土化政策，该政策大幅提高了本地企业的参与度。尽管质量较低，本地企业仍通过减少石油盗窃提高了产量。一个议价模型表明，政治关系使执法激励趋于一致，从而解决了承诺问题。执法突袭的数据显示，本地企业获得了优先保护，而与军方精英的关系是本地优势的驱动因素。本土化带来的总体收益至多相当于GDP的2.3%至5.7%。(JEL D73, F23, L71, O13, O17, Q34, Q35)
Abstract
Multinationals in the extractive sectors of weak states face resource theft by armed groups. Criminality is often abetted by state corruption, even though firms are willing to pay for protection. I study indigenization in Nigeria’s oil sector, which increased local firms’ participation substantially. Despite lower quality, local firms increase output by reducing oil theft. A bargaining model illustrates that political connections align law enforcement incentives, solving commitment problems. Data on law enforcement raids show that local firms receive preferential protection. Connections to military elites drive the local advantage. The aggregate gains from indigenization are at most between 2.3 and 5.7 percent of GDP. (JEL D73, F23, L71, O13, O17, Q34, Q35)