American Economic Review · 2025 · Ulrich Doraszelski、Katja Seim、Michael Sinkinson、Peichun Wang
中文摘要
我们探讨所有权集中对美国近期结束的激励拍卖的影响；该拍卖将频谱用途从广播电视重新配置为移动宽带。我们记录到电视台许可证的多许可证所有权现象十分显著。我们表明，在电视台竞标放弃许可证的反向拍卖中，多许可证所有者有动机扣留部分电视台，以推高其余电视台的价格。通过大规模估值与模拟分析，我们发现，这种策略性减少供给使支付给电视台的款项增加了13.5%至42.4%。(D44, D47, H82, L13, L82, L88)
Abstract
We explore the implications of ownership concentration for the recently concluded incentive auction that repurposed spectrum from broadcast TV to mobile broadband usage in the United States. We document significant multilicense ownership of TV stations. We show that in the reverse auction, in which TV stations bid to relinquish their licenses, multilicense owners have an incentive to withhold some TV stations to drive up prices for their remaining TV stations. Using a large-scale valuation and simulation exercise, we find that this strategic supply reduction increases payouts to TV stations by between 13.5 percent and 42.4 percent. (D44, D47, H82, L13, L82, L88)