抵押贷款定价与货币政策

中文摘要

本文考察中央银行政策如何影响英国的抵押贷款定价。研究表明，贷款机构通过提供由利率和贷款发起费构成的两部收费实施价格歧视；在“融资换贷款计划”等非常规货币政策实施期间，贷款机构降低了利率，同时提高了费用。利用抵押贷款需求与贷款机构竞争模型，我们发现央行政策增加了抵押贷款发放量。此外，禁止收取贷款发起费将减少贷款发放，因为该费用有助于贷款机构获取剩余，同时使其能够在对利率和费用敏感程度不同的借款人之间实施价格歧视。（JEL E43、E52、E58、G21、G28、R31）

Abstract

This paper examines how central bank policies influence mortgage pricing in the United Kingdom. It shows that lenders price discriminate by offering two-part tariffs of interest rates and origination fees, and during unconventional monetary policies like the Funding for Lending Scheme, lenders reduced interest rates while increasing fees. Using a model of mortgage demand and lender competition, we find that central bank policies increased mortgage lending. Additionally, banning origination fees would reduce lending, as fees help lenders capture surplus while allowing them to price discriminate across borrowers with different sensitivities to rates and fees. (JEL E43, E52, E58, G21, G28, R31)