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不完全信息下的不当行为与声誉

Misconduct and Reputation under Imperfect Information
Journal of Political Economy · 2025 · Francis Annan

中文摘要

不当行为——即不道德且具有欺诈迹象的市场行为——是一个重要却知之甚少的问题,它构成了许多经济交易的底层背景。我们设计了一项实地实验,以研究双向反不当行为信息项目的影响,我们将这些项目部署于加纳的移动货币(“人工ATM”)本地市场。这些项目导致不当行为大幅减少(−21个百分点=−72%),并由此带来整体市场活动、消费者福利和企业收入的更广泛改善。我们表明,处理效应源于消费者对不当行为的信念更为准确以及商家声誉顾虑增强两方面因素的共同作用。

Abstract

Misconduct—market actions that are unethical and indicative of fraud—is a significant yet poorly understood issue that underlies many economic transactions. We design a field experiment to study the impact of two-sided antimisconduct information programs, which we deploy on the local markets for mobile money (“human ATMs”) in Ghana. The programs lead to a large reduction in misconduct (−21⁢ percentage points=−72%) and, as a result, broader improvements in overall market activity, consumer welfare, and firm revenue. We show the treatment effect is due to a combination of more accurate consumer beliefs about misconduct and increased vendor reputation concerns.
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