Abstract
Abstract Scholars have argued that powerful individuals can exert influence on the path of a nation’s development. Yet the process through which people can have an effect on macro-level political economy outcomes remains unclear. This study uses the deadliest civil war in modern history, the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), to elucidate how one person—Zeng Guofan—used his personal elite networks to organize an army to suppress the rebellion, and how these networks would affect the nation’s power distribution. Two findings stand out: (i) counties that already had more prewar elites in Zeng’s networks experienced an increase in soldier deaths after he took power; and (ii) postwar political power shifted significantly toward the home counties of these elites, creating a less balanced national-level power distribution. Our findings highlight how micro-level elite networks can influence national politics and societal power distribution, shedding new light on the relationship between elites, war, and the state.