中文摘要
政治因素对宏观审慎政策是否重要？本文表明，在2000年至2014年间58个国家的221次选举前夕，宏观审慎监管的变化呈现出可预测的选举周期。选举前，限制抵押贷款和消费信贷的政策系统性地更为宽松，尤其是在经济扩张时期。与机会主义政治周期理论一致，当选举结果不确定、监管者与政治人物关系密切以及制度薄弱时，这一模式更为明显。这些结果表明，政治压力可能会限制监管者“逆风而行”的能力。（JEL D72, E32, G01, G21, G28）
Abstract
Do politics matter for macroprudential policies? I show that changes in macroprudential regulation exhibit a predictable electoral cycle in the run-up to 221 elections across 58 countries from 2000 through 2014. Policies restricting mortgages and consumer credit are systematically looser before elections, particularly during economic expansions. Consistent with theories of opportunistic political cycles, this pattern is stronger when election outcomes are uncertain, regulators are closely tied to politicians, and institutions are poor. These results suggest that political pressures may limit the ability of regulators to “lean against the wind.” (JEL D72, E32, G01, G21, G28)