American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2023 · Giorgio Gulino、Federico Masera
中文摘要
不诚实行为会传染吗？我们通过研究腐败丑闻是否会影响超市顾客在使用自助结账系统时的盗窃倾向来回答这一问题。关键在于，该系统允许购物者通过低报购物车商品价值来实施不诚实行为。利用对购物者的随机审计数据，我们表明，在当地腐败丑闻爆发后，盗窃的概率增加了16%。这一效应并非由物质激励的任何变化所驱动。初步证据表明，它是由盗窃的自施加成本降低所驱动的。(JEL D12, D73, D91, K42, L81, Z13)
Abstract
Is dishonest behavior contagious? We answer this question by studying whether corruption scandals affect the propensity of supermarket customers to steal while using a self-service checkout system. Crucially, this system allows shoppers to engage in dishonest behavior by underreporting the value of their shopping cart. Exploiting data from random audits on shoppers, we show that the probability of stealing increases by 16 percent after a local corruption scandal breaks. This effect is not driven by any change in material incentives. Suggestive evidence shows that it is driven by a reduction in the self-imposed cost of stealing. (JEL D12, D73, D91, K42, L81, Z13)