American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2023 · Jeanne Lafortune、Corinne Low
中文摘要
结婚率日益按住房所有权呈现分层。我们在一个家庭模型中对此进行考察：在该模型中，对公共品的投资会减少未来收入，因此，离婚风险会造成无效率。获得联合储蓄技术（如住房）的渠道为婚姻提供了抵押，为收入较低的一方提供了保险，并增加了专业化、公共品以及婚姻的价值。我们利用住房价格的特质性变异表明，获得住房所有权确实会导致更大的专业化。该模型还预测，以其他方式削弱婚姻契约的政策将使财富成为婚姻更重要的决定因素，我们通过实证分析证实了这一点。(JEL D12, D86, G51, H41, J12, R31)
Abstract
Marriage rates have become increasingly stratified by homeownership. We investigate this in a household model where investments in public goods reduce future earnings and, thus, divorce risk creates inefficiencies. Access to a joint savings technology, like a house, collateralizes marriage, providing insurance to the lower-earning partner and increasing specialization, public goods, and value from marriage. We use idiosyncratic variation in housing prices to show that homeownership access indeed leads to greater specialization. The model also predicts that policies that erode the marriage contract in other ways will make wealth a more important determinant of marriage, which we confirm empirically. (JEL D12, D86, G51, H41, J12, R31)