Physical Disability and Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence from a Video Résumé Field Experiment
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2023 · Charles Bellemare、Marion Goussé、Guy Lacroix、Steeve Marchand
中文摘要
我们向发布招聘广告的企业发送了虚构的求职申请。我们发现，披露残疾会使回复率降低25个百分点。这一结果无法由无障碍设施限制或因残疾导致的生产率下降来解释。我们发现，附上一段口齿伶俐的申请者的视频简历，会使有残疾和无残疾者的回复率均显著提高10个百分点，这表明在我们的研究情境中，歧视不受质量信号的影响。对观看活动的分析表明，当申请者身患残疾时，雇主会获取更少的信息。在视频较晚处披露残疾，会增加雇主的观看时长，但回复率保持不变。 (JEL C93, J14, J23, J24, J71, K31, M51)
Abstract
We sent fictitious applications to firms advertising job openings. We find that revealing a disability decreases callback rates by 25 percentage points. This result is not explained by accessibility constraints or lower productivity due to disability. We find that including a video résumé of a well-spoken applicant significantly increases callbacks by 10 percentage points for persons with and without disabilities, suggesting that discrimination is unaffected by quality signals in our context. Analysis of viewing activity suggests that employers seek less information when the applicant is disabled. Disclosing the disability later in the video increases employers' viewing time but leaves callback rates unchanged. (JEL C93, J14, J23, J24, J71, K31, M51)