Journal of Public Economics · 2025 · Luca Micheletto、Dylan Moore、Daniel Reck、Joel Slemrod
中文摘要
追溯至Ramsey (1927)的传统最优商品税分析主张，为实现福利最大化，应对需求弹性较低的商品征收较高税率。然而，政策制定者并未将效率成本最小化作为强调的政策目标。本文重新审视商品税问题，说明如果税制是由纳税人选择——或至少受到纳税人强烈影响——而这些纳税人相对于他人，对自身规避应税商品的替代能力过度自信，那么拉姆齐反弹性法则本身的吸引力可能被逆转。• 税收政策常常对弹性更高的商品征收更高税率，这与拉姆齐规则相悖：原因何在？• 一个模型：行为主体对自身相对于他人规避应税商品的替代能力过度自信。• 因此，他们认为弹性较高商品的税负会不成比例地由其他行为主体承担。• 感知到的负担转移价值抵消了对弹性更高的税基征税所带来的效率成本。• 当过度自信程度足够高时，均衡税率在弹性更高的商品上反而更高。
Abstract
Traditional optimal commodity tax analysis, dating back to Ramsey (1927), prescribes that to maximize welfare one should impose higher taxes on goods with lower demand elasticities. Yet policy makers do not stress minimizing efficiency costs as a desideratum. In this note we revisit the commodity tax problem, and show that the attractiveness of the Ramsey inverse-elasticity prescription can itself be inverted if the tax system is chosen – or at least strongly influenced – by taxpayers who are overly confident of their ability, relative to others, to substitute away from taxed goods. • Tax policy often favors higher taxes on more elastic goods, contrary to the Ramsey rule: why? • A model: agents are overconfident about their relative ability to substitute from taxed goods. • Thus, they believe taxes on elastic goods are borne disproportionately by other agents. • Value of perceived burden shifting offsets efficiency costs of more elastic tax base. • With sufficient overconfidence equilibrium taxes are higher on more elastic goods.