Influence-Seeking in U.S. Corporate Elites’ Campaign Contribution Behavior
中文摘要
我利用一个新的面板数据集，涵盖1999年至2018年间美国14,807家公司的401,557名企业领导者向美国国会议员的捐款记录，以表明美国企业精英将政治竞选捐款作为谋求政治影响力的工具。当一名政治人物被分配到处理与某企业领导者所在公司相关政策议题的委员会时，捐款增加11%。这一效应主要由流向委员会中权力最大的国会议员的捐款所驱动。据估计，若不存在影响力动机，这一时期企业领导者的捐款将减少2,000万美元。
Abstract
Abstract I leverage a new panel on the contributions to members of the U.S. Congress (MCs) from 401,557 corporate leaders of 14,807 U.S. corporations over 1999–2018 to show that U.S. corporate elites use contributions to political campaigns as a tool of political influence. Donations increase by 11% when a politician is assigned to a committee dealing with policy issues relevant to a corporate leader’s company. The effect is driven by donations to MCs with the greatest power in the committees. I estimate that, absent an influence motive, donations from corporate leaders during this period would have been lower by $20 million.