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不诚实行为与公共部门就业

Dishonesty and Public Employment
AER: Insights · 2023 · Guillermo Cruces、Martín Rossi、Ernesto Schargrodsky

中文摘要

我们利用一项自然实验,研究不诚实行为与公共部门就业之间的因果联系。在阿根廷实行义务兵役制期间,服役资格由抽签和体检共同决定。为逃避服役,面临被征召风险的个人有强烈动机在体检中作弊。这种动机随抽签号码而变化。利用这一外生变异,我们首先提供了体检作弊的证据。随后,我们表明,在健康检查中作弊概率较高的个人,日后从事非择优录用的公共部门工作的倾向也更高。(JEL D91、J45、K42、O15)

Abstract

We exploit a natural experiment to study the causal link between dishonest behavior and public employment. When military conscription was mandatory in Argentina, eligibility was determined by both a lottery and a medical examination. To avoid conscription, individuals at risk of being drafted had strong incentives to cheat in their medical examination. These incentives varied with the lottery number. Exploiting this exogenous variation, we first present evidence of cheating in medical examinations. We then show that individuals with a higher probability of having cheated in health checks exhibit a higher propensity to occupy nonmeritocratic public sector jobs later in life. (JEL D91, J45, K42, O15)
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