The effects of workers’ compensation experience rating on workers’ absences and employment
中文摘要
本文考察工伤赔偿（WC）保险经验费率制对劳动者缺勤与就业的影响。我利用法国的一项改革，该改革提高了适用于中型企业的经验费率程度，从而强化了企业减少其雇员工伤赔偿给付支出的激励。研究发现，较高程度的经验费率制显著减少了因工伤或职业病导致的缺勤；估计结果表明，劳动者每年因工缺勤天数相对于企业承担的工伤赔偿给付支出份额的弹性为−1.20，广延边际弹性为−0.43。这一减少并未被非因工缺勤的增加所抵消，表明该效应并非源于劳动者转而在非因工保险制度下提出索赔。没有证据表明该改革对就业产生不利影响。相反，结果表明，提高经验费率程度显著改善了劳动者的就业状况。
• 经验费率制激励企业减少工伤赔偿给付支出。
• 法国的一项改革提高了经验费率程度，从而强化了这些激励。
• 更强的激励使劳动者的因工缺勤大幅减少。
• 这一减少并未被非因工缺勤的增加所抵消。
• 更强的激励改善了劳动者的就业结果。
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of experience rating of workers’ compensation (WC) insurance on workers’ absences and employment. I exploit a French reform that increased the degree of experience rating assigned to medium-size firms, thereby strengthening their incentives to reduce WC benefit expenditures of their employees. The findings show that a higher degree of experience rating led to a significant reduction in absences due to work-related injuries or illnesses; the estimates imply an elasticity of a worker’s annual number of work-related absence days with respect to the share of WC benefit expenditures borne by the firm of −1.20, with an extensive-margin elasticity of −0.43. This reduction is not offset by an increase in nonwork-related absences, suggesting that this effect does not reflect a substitution toward filing claims under the nonwork-related insurance scheme. I find no evidence of adverse effects on employment. Instead, the results suggest that increasing the degree of experience rating significantly improved the employment of workers. • Experience rating creates incentives for firms to reduce workers’ compensation benefit payments. • A French reform increased the degree of experience rating, thereby strengthening these incentives. • Stronger incentives led to a substantial reduction in work-related absences taken by workers. • This reduction was not offset by an increase in nonwork-related absences. • Stronger incentives led to improvements in workers’ employment outcomes.