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医生竞争:进入与替代

Physician Competition: Entry and Substitution
Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2026 · [{"name": "Joshua D. Gottlieb", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research"]}, {"name": "Sean Nicholson", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "Cornell University"]}]

中文摘要

我们描述医生市场中的竞争,重点关注近几十年来进入壁垒与替代可能性如何变化。对医学院招生名额和住院医师岗位的监管上限——尤其是高薪专科的上限——持续限制进入,为获得这些名额的人带来高回报,并将学业造诣最高的受训者引向高薪领域。但受过训练的医生在患者市场上日益与执业护士、医师助理及其他中级执业人员竞争。这些替代者的培养扩张速度远快于医生供给。我们呈现关于医生输送管道的关键事实,提出一个将专科收入与进入壁垒相联系的概念框架,并描述中级服务提供者的兴起。这些事实意味着,医生市场中有效的竞争政策必须超越传统的集中度指标,转而关注规制谁能够提供医疗服务的制度和法律。

Abstract

We describe competition in the physician market, focusing on how entry barriers and substitution possibilities have changed in recent decades. Regulatory caps on medical school seats and residency slots—especially for high-paying specialties—continue to ration entry, generate high returns for those who gain these slots, and direct the most academically accomplished trainees toward lucrative fields. But trained physicians increasingly compete with nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and other mid-level practitioners in the market for patients. Training of these substitutes has expanded far more rapidly than physician supply. We present key facts about the physician pipeline, a conceptual framework linking specialty earnings to entry barriers, and describe the rise of mid-level providers. These facts mean that effective competition policy in physician markets must look beyond conventional concentration measures and focus on the institutions and laws that govern who can provide medical care.
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