带薪病假的经济学
The Economics of Paid Sick Leave
Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2026 · [{"name": "Stefan Pichler", "affiliation": ["University of Groningen"]}, {"name": "Christopher Prinz", "affiliation": ["Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques"]}, {"name": "Stefan Thewissen", "affiliation": ["Nyenrode Business University"]}, {"name": "Nicolas R. Ziebarth", "affiliation": ["Centre for European Economic Research"]}]
中文摘要
本文从理论和实证两个视角考察带薪病假的经济学。过去十年，关于带薪病假的研究动态演进，主要由美国病假工资强制规定的扩散所推动——这些规定使美国所有工作中带薪病假的可及性从63%提高到77%。我们首先讨论政府监管带薪病假的经济学理据，特别是个人带病工作时与传染性疾病相关的负外部性。随后，我们讨论带薪病假方案总体设计中的关键权衡，以及设定具体政策参数时的权衡。最后，我们回顾用于研究最优带薪病假政策的经济建模方法。
Abstract
This article examines the economics of paid sick leave from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Research on paid sick leave has evolved dynamically over the last decade, primarily driven by the spread of US sick pay mandates, which have increased paid sick leave access from 63 percent to 77 percent in all US jobs. We begin by discussing the economic rationales for government regulation of paid sick leave, particularly the negative externalities associated with contagious diseases when individuals work while sick. After that, we discuss the key trade-offs in the general design of paid sick leave schemes, along with the trade-offs when setting specific policy parameters. Finally, we review economic modeling approaches to study optimal paid sick leave policies.