← ireadpaper · 顶刊中的公共政策研究

金融约束下的房产税与住房配置

Property Taxes and Housing Allocation Under Financial Constraints
NBER Working Papers · 2026 · Joshua Coven、Sebastian Golder、Arpit Gupta、Abdoulaye Ndiaye

中文摘要

较低的房产税会加剧老年房主的住房锁定效应,限制年轻家庭获得住房。提高房产税会通过两种渠道将住房重新配置给年轻人:房产税资本化为更低的房价,降低了受金融约束购房者所需支付的首付款,这是一种内嵌杠杆形式;与此同时,更高的纳税义务增加了老年房主的持有成本。在我们的世代交叠模型中,将加利福尼亚州的房产税提高至得克萨斯州的水平,会提高年轻人的住房自有率,同时降低老年人的住房自有率。取消计税基础调升也会降低老年人的住房自有率,这表明其住房持有状态是由遗产税收优惠支撑的。住房的税收待遇塑造了代际间的住房配置。

Abstract

Low property taxes amplify lock-in among elderly homeowners, limiting housing access for young families. Raising them reallocates housing toward the young through two channels: capitalization into lower prices reduces required downpayments for financially constrained buyers, a form of embedded leverage, while higher tax obligations raise holding costs for older owners. In our overlapping generations model, raising California’s property taxes to Texas levels increases young homeownership while decreasing elderly homeownership. Removing step-up basis also lowers elderly homeownership, suggesting their tenure is sustained by bequest tax advantages. The tax treatment of housing shapes housing allocation across generations.
在 ireadpaper 查看全部 →