中文摘要
六百多年来，围绕竞业禁止条款的争论一直聚焦于：这类条款究竟是有效率的契约工具，还是针对劳动者的反竞争限制。本文结合近期的政策关注以及新的实证和理论研究，重新审视这一争论。支持者认为，竞业禁止条款对于保护企业在培训和商业秘密方面的投资不可或缺，能够提高生产率和工资。然而，近期研究表明，竞业禁止条款的广泛使用——且其适用范围经常延伸至不涉及敏感信息的岗位——及其可执行性，会降低劳动力流动性、工资、创新和创业活动。此外，在许多情况下，限制性较弱的合同条款似乎同样能够保障企业利益。竞业禁止条款对其他劳动者及跨州边界产生溢出效应的证据，以及即便条款不可执行时仍存在行为效应的证据，都引发了这样的疑问：现有的州级执行制度能否充分应对其已观察到的这些影响。
Abstract
For over 600 years, debates over noncompete clauses have centered on whether they function as efficient contracting tools or anticompetitive restraints on workers. This article reassesses that debate in light of recent policy attention and new empirical and theoretical research. Proponents argue that noncompetes are necessary to protect investments in training and trade secrets, increasing productivity and wages. However, recent studies indicate that the widespread use of noncompetes—frequently extending beyond roles involving sensitive information—and their enforceability lower mobility, wages, innovation, and entrepreneurship. Moreover, in many cases, less restrictive contractual terms appear to safeguard firm interests. Evidence of spillovers to other workers and across state boundaries, as well as behavioral effects even when noncompetes are unenforceable, raises questions about whether existing state-level enforcement regimes adequately address their observed impacts.