中文摘要
我们采用稳健设计的非贝叶斯方法，研究如何规制垄断企业。我们推导出一项使监管者最坏情形遗憾最小化的政策，其中遗憾是监管者在完全信息下的收益与其实际收益之差。当监管者的收益为消费者剩余时，他对企业的平均收益设定上限。当其收益为消费者与企业的总剩余时，他向企业提供按件补贴，同时对补贴总额设定上限。对于中间情形，监管者将这三种政策工具结合起来，以平衡三个目标：保护消费者剩余、缓解生产不足以及限制潜在的生产过剩。（JEL D21, D42, D83, H25, L51）
Abstract
We study how to regulate a monopolistic firm using a robust-design, non-Bayesian approach. We derive a policy that minimizes the regulator’s worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator’s complete-information payoff and his realized payoff. When the regulator’s payoff is consumers’ surplus, he caps the firm’s average revenue. When his payoff is the total surplus of both consumers and the firm, he offers a piece rate subsidy to the firm while capping the total subsidy. For intermediate cases, the regulator combines these three policy instruments to balance three goals: protecting consumers’ surplus, mitigating underproduction, and limiting potential overproduction. (JEL D21, D42, D83, H25, L51)