裁员边际上的工资黏性

中文摘要

我们设计并实施了一项针对失业保险（UI）领取者的创新调查，由此获得了关于裁员边际上工资黏性的新见解。大多数失业保险领取者愿意接受5%—10%的减薪以保住工作，三分之一的人愿意接受25%的减薪。然而，劳动者与雇主之间就削减工资、福利或工时以替代裁员展开的讨论极为罕见。在我们的样本中，约四分之一的裁员不符合双边有效分离的理论条件。我们基于研究发现及其他证据，评估了工资黏性理论及其在裁员中的作用。（JEL C83、E24、J31、J63、J65）

Abstract

We design and field an innovative survey of unemployment insurance (UI) recipients that yields new insights about wage stickiness on the layoff margin. A majority of UI recipients would accept pay cuts of 5–10 percent to save their jobs, and one-third would accept a 25 percent cut. Yet worker-employer discussions about cuts in pay, benefits, or hours in lieu of layoffs are exceedingly rare. Roughly one-quarter of the layoffs in our sample violate the theoretical condition for bilaterally efficient separations. We draw on our findings and other evidence to assess theories of wage stickiness and its role in layoffs. (JEL C83, E24, J31, J63, J65)