中文摘要
我们构建了一个新颖的有限理性模型，将不完美推理视为自动（系统1）与分析（系统2）思维之间的相互作用。在此过程中，我们利用关于未知最优策略函数的心理信息获取的结构化、约束最优经济框架，将认知心理学的经验共识形式化。一个关键结果是，主体在面对寻常（非寻常）的世界状态时推理更少（更多），从而产生依赖于状态和历史的行为。我们的应用是一个在其他方面标准的、无先验行为偏误的不完全市场模型。行为与信念的遍历分布由内生学习陷阱刻画，其中局部稳定的状态动态在状态空间中生成寻常区域，在这些区域内行为似乎遵循基于记忆的启发式法则。这导致了具有诸多经验上合意属性的内生行为偏误：即使对于无约束主体，边际消费倾向依然较高，依赖手到口状态更为频繁且持久，并且财富不平等程度高于标准模型。
Abstract
Abstract We develop a novel bounded rationality model of imperfect reasoning as the interaction between automatic (System 1) and analytical (System 2) thinking. In doing so, we formalize the empirical consensus of cognitive psychology using a structural, constrained-optimal economic framework of mental information acquisition about the unknown optimal policy function. A key result is that agents reason less (more) when facing usual (unusual) states of the world, producing state- and history-dependent behavior. Our application is an otherwise standard incomplete-markets model with no a priori behavioral biases. The ergodic distribution of actions and beliefs is characterized by endogenous learning traps, where locally stable state dynamics generate familiar regions of the state space within which behavior appears to follow memory-based heuristics. This results in endogenous behavioral biases that have many empirically desirable properties: the marginal propensity to consume is high even for unconstrained agents, hand-to-mouth status is more frequent and persistent, and there is more wealth inequality than in the standard model.