Liberty, Security, and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Illiberal Democracies
Review of Economic Studies · 2023 · Gabriele Gratton、Barton E. Lee
中文摘要
我们研究了非自由民主政体兴衰的一个模型。选民既重视自由，也重视经济安全。在危机时期，选民可能更倾向于选举一个非自由政府，该政府通过违反宪法约束，以较少的自由换取更大的经济安全。然而，违反这些约束使政府得以操纵信息，进而削弱选举问责。我们说明了自由宪政的某些要素如何促使选民选举非自由政府，而这些政府会以低效率的方式长期执政——甚至永远执政。我们由此得出关于哪些因素能使宪法保持稳定、抵御非自由政府崛起的见解。我们扩展了模型，允许非自由政府突破制衡机制并演变为专制政体。我们表明，更强的制衡机制是一把双刃剑：它会减缓专制化进程，却可能提高专制化发生的可能性。我们讨论了这一理论框架的实证相关性及其与现实案例的联系。
Abstract
Abstract We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and economic security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that, by violating constitutional constraints, offers greater economic security but less liberty. However, violating these constraints allows the government to manipulate information, in turn reducing electoral accountability. We show how elements of liberal constitutions induce voters to elect illiberal governments that remain in power for inefficiently long—including forever. We derive insights into what makes constitutions stable against the rise of illiberal governments. We extend the model to allow for illiberal governments to overcome checks and balances and become autocracies. We show that stronger checks and balances are a double-edged sword: they slow down autocratization but may make it more likely. We discuss the empirical relevance of our theoretical framework and its connection to real world examples.