A Comment on:“Walras–Bowley Lecture: Market Power and Wage Inequality” by Shubhdeep Deb, Jan Eeckhout, Aseem Patel, and Lawrence Warren
中文摘要
劳动经济学中一个蓬勃发展的文献聚焦于对雇主劳动市场势力进行建模，通常发现不可忽视的买方垄断势力估计值。另有较少文献同时纳入了产品市场势力。Deb, Eeckhout, Patel 和 Warren (2024) 是将寡头-寡头买方垄断模型应用于美国劳动市场的一个例子，主张不断上升的市场势力对工资水平和不平等有重要影响。我支持将产业组织学与劳动经济学相结合，作为研究工资和企业活力的富有成效的方式，但主张应更广泛地考察： 雇主在劳动市场和产品市场中势力的不同程度； 研究加成的动态来源（例如通过创新）；以及 考虑工资议价模型，而不仅仅是工资张贴模型，因为二者对工资设定具有一些截然不同的含义。
Abstract
A burgeoning literature in labor economics is focused on modeling employer labor market power, generally finding nontrivial estimates of monopsony power. A smaller literature also simultaneously incorporates product market power. Deb, Eeckhout, Patel, and Warren (2024) is an example of applying an oligopoly‐oligopsony model to the U.S. labor market, arguing for important effects on wage levels and inequality from rising market power. I support combining IO and labor as a fruitful way of studying wages and business dynamism, but argue for looking more broadly at (i) differential degrees of employer power in labor and product markets; (ii) investigating the dynamic sources of markups (e.g., through innovation), and (iii) considering wage bargaining models, not just wage posting models, which have some starkly different implications for wage setting.