社会歧视的政治经济学

中文摘要

本文研究社会歧视的成因与后果。我们考察这样一个劳动力市场：与收益无关的身份特征可能影响招聘决策。身份具有可塑性，多数群体成员可能在社会关系中被视为与少数群体相关联。对身份传染的恐惧可能维持一个完全隔离的劳动力市场，其中具有少数群体特征的劳动者失业率更高，少数群体所有的企业生产率低于多数群体所有的企业。当少数群体在经济层面的融入程度较低（其劳动者人数多于雇主人数）时，相较于无歧视的均衡，具有多数群体身份的劳动者在存在歧视的均衡中获得更好的劳动力市场结果。此时，以当选为目标的候选人便有选举激励提出针对少数群体的象征性政策，从而在劳动力市场中触发社会歧视。由于具有多数群体身份的劳动者因社会歧视而境况改善，同时经济规模收缩，象征性政策的实施与更低的税收和更少的再分配相关。

Abstract

<div> <div> This paper studies the causes and consequences of social discrimination. We consider a labor market in which payoff-irrelevant identity traits can shape hiring decisions. Identity is malleable and a majority group member can become socially associated with the minority group. Fear of identity contagion can sustain a fully segregated labor markets in which workers with minority traits experience higher unemployment and minority-owned firms are less productive than their majority counterparts. When the minority group is poorly integrated economically (consisting of more workers than employers), workers with majority identity obtain better labor market outcomes in an equilibrium with discrimination than without. Office-motivated candidates then have electoral incentives to propose symbolic policies targeting the minority to trigger social discrimination in the labor market. As majority-identity workers are better off with social discrimination and the economy shrinks, the implementation of symbolic policies is associated with lower taxes and less redistribution.  </div> </div>