中文摘要
我们研究一个具有不完全信息的经典集体行动博弈。个体试图协调以实现共同目标，同时也面临搭便车的诱惑。更相似的信息有助于他们协调，但也可能加剧搭便车。我们的主要结果表明，当共同目标足够具有挑战性（容易）时，更相似的信息会促进（阻碍）共同目标的实现。我们运用这一洞见来说明：为何权力较弱的威权政府在限制新闻自由时可能面临更大规模的抗议；委员会多样性在何种情形下对有成本的投票有益；以及更多样化的社区在何种情形下会对公共品供给作出更多贡献。（JEL C71, D71, D72, D81, D82, D83, H41）
Abstract
We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. More similar information can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving the common goal when it is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why less powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests if they restrict press freedom, when committee diversity is beneficial in costly voting, and when a more diverse community contributes more to public good provision. (JEL C71, D71, D72, D81, D82, D83, H41)