American Economic Review · 2024 · John J. Horton
中文摘要
在一个在线劳动力市场上发布职位空缺的企业被随机分配了最低时薪。面对最低工资时，进行招聘的企业减少了，但它们招聘到的工人获得了更高的工资。工作时间大幅下降。受处理的企业转向雇佣生产率更高的工人。利用实验结束后该平台在全市场范围内实施最低工资这一情况，我发现许多实验结果在均衡状态下同样成立，包括向生产率更高工人的替代。然而，可能会受到最低工资约束的职位发布数量也出现了大幅减少。（JEL J22, J23, J31, J38）
Abstract
Firms posting job openings in an online labor market were randomly assigned minimum hourly wages. When facing a minimum wage, fewer firms hired, but those they did hire paid higher wages. Hoursworked fell substantially. Treated firms shifted to hiring more productive workers. Using the platform's imposition of a market-wide minimum wage after the experiment, I find that many of the experimental results also hold in equilibrium, including the substitution towards more productive workers. However, there was also a large reduction in the number of jobs posted for which the minimum wage would likely bind. (JEL J22, J23, J31, J38)