American Economic Review · 2024 · Raúl Sierra、Kristof Titeca、Haoyang Xie、Aimable Amani Lameke、Albert Jolino Malukisa
中文摘要
本文揭示了金沙萨交通警察机构内部的一项腐败运作机制。首先，多个数据收集渠道表明，该机构的收入是罚款收入的五倍，来源于交通警察官员、其管理人员与司法警察官员组成联盟，合谋向驾驶员敲诈勒索。其次，一项实验的分析表明，该机制损害了公共服务。第三，该机制似乎是对所处环境的理性回应，但其运作逻辑广泛存在。研究发现表明，官员联盟尽管会造成社会成本，却能带来巨额非法收入，这使国家能力薄弱这一观念呈现出更复杂的面貌。（JEL D73, H76, K42, O17）
Abstract
This paper provides insight into a corruption scheme in Kinshasa’s traffic police agency. First, various data collection branches show that the agency’s revenue is five times that from fines and is derived from a coalition of traffic police officials, their managers, and judicial police officers scheming to extort drivers. Second, the analysis of an experiment suggests that the scheme subverts service. Third, the scheme appears to be a rational response to the context, but its logic is widespread. The findings suggest that coalitions of officials, while being socially costly, can yield large illicit revenue, nuancing the notion of state weakness. (JEL D73, H76, K42, O17)