中文摘要
小企业难以发展到超过几名雇员的规模。我们在肯尼亚的通勤小巴中引入监控设备，并通过一款新型移动应用程序随机决定哪些小巴车主能够访问这些数据。我们发现，处理组车主修改了合同条款，以促使司机付出更高努力并降低其风险承担。这降低了企业成本并提高了企业盈利能力。有提示性证据表明部分企业实现了扩张。这些结果表明，小企业或许能够利用监控技术来克服道德风险问题并提升其盈利能力。(JEL D22, D24, D82, J41, L25, L92, O14)
Abstract
Small firms struggle to grow beyond a few employees. We introduce monitoring devices into commuter minibuses in Kenya and randomize which minibus owners have access to the data using a novel mobile app. We find that treated vehicle owners modify the terms of the contract to induce higher effort and lower risk taking from their drivers. This reduces firm costs and increases firm profitability. There is suggestive evidence that some firms expand. These results suggest that small firms may be able to utilize monitoring technologies to overcome problems of moral hazard and enhance their profitability. (JEL D22, D24, D82, J41, L25, L92, O14)