中文摘要
我们分析了在知情长期卖方可以与短期不知情买方重复交易的市场中，过去交易量的透明度效应。透明度允许买方观察到先前售出的数量。在具有期内买方垄断（每期单一买方）的市场中，如果事前预期质量较低，透明度会降低福利；但如果预期质量较高，透明度会提高福利。在具有期内竞争（每期多个买方）的市场中，该效应则相反。透明度在效率影响上的这种差异，可以通过买方竞争如何影响卖方攫取租金的能力来解释，这反过来又影响了市场甄别。(JEL D40, D82, D83, G14, L15)
Abstract
We analyze the effect of transparency of past trading volumes in markets where an informed long-lived seller can repeatedly trade with short-lived uninformed buyers. Transparency allows buyers to observe previously sold quantities. In markets with intraperiod monopsony (single buyer each period), transparency reduces welfare if the ex ante expected quality is low but improves welfare if the expected quality is high. The effect is reversed in markets with intraperiod competition (multiple buyers each period). This discrepancy in the efficiency implications of transparency is explained by how buyer competition affects the seller’s ability to capture rents, which, in turn, influences market screening. (JEL D40, D82, D83, G14, L15)